Initial commit

meta-security/meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima-evm-keys/ima-evm-keys_1.0.bb

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+SUMMARY = "IMA/EMV public keys"
+LICENSE = "MIT"
+LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://${COREBASE}/meta/COPYING.MIT;md5=3da9cfbcb788c80a0384361b4de20420"
+
+inherit features_check
+REQUIRED_DISTRO_FEATURES = "ima"
+
+ALLOW_EMPTY:${PN} = "1"
+
+do_install () {
+    if [ -e "${IMA_EVM_X509}" ]; then
+        install -d ${D}/${sysconfdir}/keys
+        install "${IMA_EVM_X509}" ${D}${sysconfdir}/keys/x509_evm.der
+        ln -rs ${D}${sysconfdir}/keys/x509_evm.der ${D}${sysconfdir}/keys/x509_ima.der
+    fi
+}
+do_install[file-checksums] += "${@'${IMA_EVM_X509}:%s' % os.path.exists('${IMA_EVM_X509}')}"

meta-security/meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima-evm-utils/ima-evm-utils/0001-Do-not-get-generation-using-ioctl-when-evm_portable-.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From 00ace817c5134d9844db387cadb9517ebad43808 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
+Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2023 11:43:55 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] Do not get generation using ioctl when evm_portable is true
+
+If a signatures is detected as being portable do not attempt to read the
+generation with the ioctl since in some cases this may not be supported
+by the filesystem and is also not needed for computing a portable
+signature.
+
+This avoids the current work-around of passing --generation 0 when the
+ioctl is not supported by the filesystem.
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
+---
+Upstream-Status: Pending
+
+ src/evmctl.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/evmctl.c b/src/evmctl.c
+index 6d2bb67..c35a28c 100644
+--- a/src/evmctl.c
++++ b/src/evmctl.c
+@@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ static int calc_evm_hash(const char *file, unsigned char *hash)
+ 	if (mode_str)
+ 		st.st_mode = strtoul(mode_str, NULL, 10);
+ 
+-	if (!evm_immutable) {
++	if (!evm_immutable && !evm_portable) {
+ 		if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) && !generation_str) {
+ 			int fd = open(file, 0);
+ 
+---
+Upstream-Status: Pending
+
+2.39.2
+
+

meta-security/meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima-evm-utils/ima-evm-utils_1.5.bb

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+DESCRIPTION = "IMA/EVM control utility"
+LICENSE = "GPL-2.0-with-OpenSSL-exception"
+LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=b234ee4d69f5fce4486a80fdaf4a4263"
+
+DEPENDS += "openssl attr keyutils"
+
+DEPENDS:class-native += "openssl-native keyutils-native"
+
+FILESEXTRAPATHS:append := "${THISDIR}/${PN}:"
+
+SRC_URI = " \
+    https://github.com/mimizohar/ima-evm-utils/releases/download/v${PV}/${BP}.tar.gz \
+    file://0001-Do-not-get-generation-using-ioctl-when-evm_portable-.patch \
+"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "45f1caa3ad59ec59a1d6a74ea5df38c413488cd952ab62d98cf893c15e6f246d"
+
+inherit pkgconfig autotools features_check
+
+REQUIRED_DISTRO_FEATURES = "ima"
+REQUIRED_DISTRO_FEATURES:class-native = ""
+
+EXTRA_OECONF += "MANPAGE_DOCBOOK_XSL=0"
+EXTRA_OECONF:append:class-target = " --with-kernel-headers=${STAGING_KERNEL_BUILDDIR}"
+
+# blkid is called by evmctl when creating evm checksums.
+# This is less useful when signing files on the build host,
+# so disable it when compiling on the host.
+RDEPENDS:${PN}:append:class-target = " util-linux-blkid libcrypto attr libattr keyutils"
+
+BBCLASSEXTEND = "native nativesdk"

meta-security/meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima_policy_appraise_all/files/ima_policy_appraise_all

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+#
+# Integrity measure policy (http://sourceforge.net/p/linux-ima/wiki/Home/#measure-nothing-appraise-everything)
+# 
+# Do not measure anything, but appraise everything
+#
+# PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x9fa0
+# SYSFS_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x62656572
+# DEBUGFS_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x64626720
+# TMPFS_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x01021994
+# RAMFS_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x858458f6
+# DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x1cd1
+# BIFMT
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x42494e4d
+# SECURITYFS_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x73636673
+# SELINUXFS_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
+# NSFS_MAGIC (introduced in 3.19, see cd025f7 and e149ed2 in the upstream Linux kernel)
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x6e736673
+# EFIVARFS_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0xde5e81e4
+# Cgroup
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x27e0eb
+# Cgroup2
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x63677270
+
+# Appraise libraries
+appraise func=MMAP_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
+# Appraise executables
+appraise func=BPRM_CHECK

meta-security/meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima_policy_appraise_all/ima-policy-appraise-all_1.0.bb

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+SUMMARY = "IMA sample simple appraise policy "
+LICENSE = "MIT"
+LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://${COREBASE}/meta/COPYING.MIT;md5=3da9cfbcb788c80a0384361b4de20420"
+
+SRC_URI = " file://ima_policy_appraise_all"
+
+inherit features_check
+REQUIRED_DISTRO_FEATURES = "ima"
+
+do_install () {
+    install -d ${D}/${sysconfdir}/ima
+    install ${WORKDIR}/ima_policy_appraise_all ${D}/${sysconfdir}/ima/ima-policy
+}
+
+FILES:${PN} = "${sysconfdir}/ima"
+RDEPENDS:${PN} = "ima-evm-utils"

meta-security/meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima_policy_hashed/files/ima_policy_hashed

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+# With this policy, all files on regular partitions are
+# appraised. Files with signed IMA hash and normal hash are
+# accepted. Signed files cannot be modified while hashed files can be
+# (which will also update the hash). However, signed files can
+# be deleted, so in practice it is still possible to replace them
+# with a modified version.
+#
+# Without EVM, this is obviously not very secure, so this policy is
+# just an example and/or basis for further improvements. For that
+# purpose, some comments show what could be added to make the policy
+# more secure.
+#
+# With EVM the situation might be different because access
+# to the EVM key can be restricted.
+#
+# Files which are appraised are also measured. This allows
+# debugging whether a file is in policy by looking at
+# /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements
+
+# PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x9fa0
+dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0
+# SYSFS_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x62656572
+dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572
+# DEBUGFS_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x64626720
+dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720
+# TMPFS_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x01021994
+dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
+# RAMFS_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x858458f6
+dont_measure fsmagic=0x858458f6
+# DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x1cd1
+dont_measure fsmagic=0x1cd1
+# BIFMT
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x42494e4d
+dont_measure fsmagic=0x42494e4d
+# SECURITYFS_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x73636673
+dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
+# SELINUXFS_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
+dont_measure fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
+# NSFS_MAGIC (introduced in 3.19, see cd025f7 and e149ed2 in the upstream Linux kernel)
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x6e736673
+dont_measure fsmagic=0x6e736673
+# SMACK_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x43415d53
+dont_measure fsmagic=0x43415d53
+# CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x27e0eb
+dont_measure fsmagic=0x27e0eb
+# CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x63677270
+dont_measure fsmagic=0x63677270
+# EFIVARFS_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0xde5e81e4
+dont_measure fsmagic=0xde5e81e4
+
+# Special partition, no checking done.
+# dont_measure  fsuuid=a11234...
+# dont_appraise fsuuid=a11243...
+
+# Special immutable group.
+# appraise appraise_type=imasig func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ fgroup=200
+
+# All executables must be signed - too strict, we need to
+# allow installing executables on the device.
+# appraise appraise_type=imasig func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
+# appraise appraise_type=imasig func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
+
+# Default rule. Would be needed also when other rules were added that
+# determine what to do in case of reading (mask=MAY_READ or
+# mask=MAY_EXEC) because otherwise writing does not update the file
+# hash.
+appraise
+measure

meta-security/meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima_policy_hashed/ima-policy-hashed_1.0.bb

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+SUMMARY = "IMA sample hash policy"
+LICENSE = "MIT"
+LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://${COREBASE}/meta/COPYING.MIT;md5=3da9cfbcb788c80a0384361b4de20420"
+
+SRC_URI = " \
+    file://ima_policy_hashed \
+"
+
+inherit features_check
+REQUIRED_DISTRO_FEATURES = "ima"
+
+do_install () {
+    install -d ${D}/${sysconfdir}/ima
+    install ${WORKDIR}/ima_policy_hashed ${D}/${sysconfdir}/ima/ima-policy
+}
+
+FILES:${PN} = "${sysconfdir}/ima"
+RDEPENDS:${PN} = "ima-evm-utils"

meta-security/meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima_policy_simple/files/ima_policy_simple

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# Very simple policy demonstrating the systemd policy loading bug
+# (policy with one line works, two lines don't).
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x9fa0
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x62656572

meta-security/meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima_policy_simple/ima-policy-simple_1.0.bb

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+SUMMARY = "IMA sample simple policy"
+LICENSE = "MIT"
+LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://${COREBASE}/meta/COPYING.MIT;md5=3da9cfbcb788c80a0384361b4de20420"
+
+SRC_URI = " file://ima_policy_simple"
+
+inherit features_check
+REQUIRED_DISTRO_FEATURES = "ima"
+
+do_install () {
+    install -d ${D}/${sysconfdir}/ima
+    install ${WORKDIR}/ima_policy_simple ${D}/${sysconfdir}/ima/ima-policy
+}
+
+FILES:${PN} = "${sysconfdir}/ima"
+RDEPENDS:${PN} = "ima-evm-utils"